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INTRODUCTION

During the brief zenith of school desegregation litigation in the late
1960s and early 1970s, hundreds of school districts across the nation, and
particularly across the South, were found liable for intentional racial
discrimination and became subject to federal court supervision of approved
plans to achieve integration.
The period of aggressive enforcement was
short-lived however, and by the mid-1970s, and accelerating through the
1980s and 1990s, an increasingly conservative Supreme Court and
presidential administrations first slowed the scope and intensity of school
integration, and then actively pushed to end judicial enforcement and

Mark Dorosin is the Managing Attorney at the UNC Center for Civil Rights.
University of North Carolina, J.D.; University of North Carolina-Greensboro, M.A.; Duke
University, B.A. The author is especially grateful to my comrades Elizabeth Haddix, Senior
Staff Attorney at the Center, and Brenda Shum and Ezra Rosenberg of the Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, for their superhuman efforts in litigating these cases.
1.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST
THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 6 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
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2

oversight of existing desegregation cases. This was true even in school
districts that remained racially segregated or that had achieved some
measure of integration, but had since-and while still under court orderbecome resegregated.3
Despite the passage of time since these desegregation orders were
entered and it is estimated that there remain over 100 school districts still
subject to such orders 4-their legal significance in potentially achieving
integration should have increased, especially in the face of Court decisions
deifying "intent" in proving discrimination and severely limiting the role of
race in student assignment for districts not subject to desegregation orders.5
This is because of the unique procedural posture of such cases. Under wellestablished school desegregation jurisprudence, once a court finds the school
district constitutionally liable for racial discrimination in violation of the
14th Amendment (i.e. that is has operated a racially "dual" system) and a
desegregation order is entered, the district has an affirmative duty to remedy
the segregation by taking "all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the
unconstitutional de jure system." 6 The legal presumption for a school
district subject to such an order is that any current racial imbalances within
the school system are vestiges of past discrimination.
In order to be
declared "unitary" and relieved of further court oversight, the evidentiary
burden rests with the school board to rebut this presumption and prove that it
has remedied the impacts of past segregation to the extent practicable, and to
demonstrate that any remaining racial disparities are the result of
independent factors unrelated to the board's actions (or inactions).8 Thus,
the distinction between a district still subject to court order and one that has
been declared unitary (or was never subject to order) is significant. A

2.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, supranote 1 at 9-12.

3.

Id.

4.
See YUE Qiu & NIKOLE HANNAH-JONES,
SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
ORDERS
(2014),
desegregation-orders (showing 330 school districts
orders).
5.
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 501
Clause reaches only those racial imbalances shown

PRO PUBLICA, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/
subject to mandated school segregation
(1992) (stating that the Equal Protection
to be intentionally caused by the State);

Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89, Oklahoma Cty., Okl. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991) (stating that courts have used the term "dual" to denote a
school system which engages in intentional segregation of students by race, and "unitary" to
describe a school system which is in compliance with the command of the Constitution that
that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws).

6.
Freemam, 503 U.S. at 485.
7. Id.
8.
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-459 (1979) (citing Green v.
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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district under court order to desegregate may and often must use race-based
policies and practices as necessary to fulfill its affirmative remedial
obligations under the order, 9 while the much more restrictive and limited
consideration of race in schools, as proscribed in ParentsInvolved, 0 applies
only to districts that have never been under court order or that were at one
time but have since achieved unitary status."
The continuing viability of the bright-line legal distinction between
districts under court order with the concomitant burdens of proof and
remedial obligations to address the continuing vestiges of racial
discrimination-and those that are not was the focus of two recent decisions
by the Fourth Circuit in a case that began in the 1960s.12 In its first opinion,
the Court issued a ruling that resoundingly reaffirmed the progressive
jurisprudence that helped the nation begin to achieve the promise of Brown
and attain a significant measure of school integration. 3 In a subsequent
decision in the same case just three years later however, the Court retreated
from its earlier holding, blurred the clear line it had previously recognized,
and added another substantial setback to the legal struggle to end racial
isolation in public schools.14
II.

SOME BACKGROUND ON DESEGREGATION IN PITT COUNTY: EDWARDS
V. GREENVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND TEEL V. PITT COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION

In the early 1970s, as a result of litigation brought by African American
parents, the then separate Pitt County and Greenville City school districts
were placed under court orders to desegregate. 5 During the early 1970s,

9.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
10. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 737-38,
747-48 (2007).
11. Id.
12. Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 139-40 (4th Cir. 2015); Everett v.
Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2012).
13. See Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ. (Everett 1), 678 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating that where a school district has not attained unitary status the evidentiary burden is on
the school board to prove that a student assignment plan is consistent with controlling
desegregation orders and fulfills the school board's affirmative duty to eliminate vestiges of
discrimination and move toward unitary status).
14. Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ. (Everett II), 788 F.3d 132, 149-50 (4th Cir. 2015).
15. Opinion and Order at 6, Teel v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 272 F.Supp. 703
(E.D.N.C.1967) (No. 6:65-CV-569); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, Edwards v.
Greenville City Bd. of Educ., No. 6:69-CV-702, (E.D.N.C. July 7, 1970).
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both districts worked to implement their respective desegregation orders.16
Following the implementation of these plans, both districts experienced an
increase in student integration, but by the end of the decade and into the
early 1980s, the county began to experience increasing inter-district
segregation as white students abandoned the city schools for the county.' 7 In
an effort to stem the resegregation of the school systems, the districts
merged into the current Pitt County Schools in 1987.18 The merged district
remained subject to the court's desegregation orders, although the case
remained dormant for many years.19
In 2005, faced with significant resegregation in a number of elementary
schools, the School Board ("Board") adopted a student reassignment plan
specifically designed to address the growing racial imbalances. 20 In its
deliberations about the proposed reassignment, the Board specifically
referred to its obligations under the existing desegregation orders and the
fact that, pursuant to those orders, it was appropriate to expressly consider
21
race in developing the student reassignment plan.
A group of white parents opposed to the plan organized the Greenville
Parents Association ("GPA"), and in February 2006 filed a federal civil
rights complaint with the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of U.S.
Department of Education, claiming the reassignment plan constituted race
22
discrimination against their (white) children.
When the plan went forward
in August 2006, it failed to reach its desired integrative effect as hundreds of
white parents refused to send their children to the schools to which they had
23
been assigned.

16. Order at 1-2, Edwards v. Greenville City Bd. of Educ., No. 702 (E.D.N.C. July 31,
1970); Order, Teel v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. Educ., 272 F.Supp. 703 (E.D.N.C.1967) (No. 569).
17. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 137 (4th Cir. 2015).
18. H.B. 1487, 1986, 1985th Sess. (N.C. 1986).
19. See Everett 1, 678 F.3d 281, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina closed the Edward and Teel cases
subject to being reopened whenever a pleading was filed in either case to warrant reopening.
Subsequently, the Pitt County Board of Education remained subject to the Edwards and Teel
desegregation orders for over thirty years before the cases were consolidated and reopened).
20. See id. at 285 (stating that the 2006-2007 academic year assignment plan, adopted
under the Pitt County School Board Policy 10.107, specified that all Pitt County schools
should be within an overall 70/30 racial balance); see also id. at 285 n.3 (explaining that the
racial imbalances in the Pitt County School district remained).
21. Everett 1, 678 F.3d at 285.
22. Everett II, 788 F.3d 132, 152 (4th Cir. 2015).
23. Rather than send their children to the majority African American schools to which
they had been assigned, white parents "enrolled their children in private schools, transferred
their children to other public school systems, or requested transfers for the children within
PCS. Some parents actually moved." See supra note 14, at 8.
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During the course of its investigation, OCR learned of the outstanding
desegregation orders in Edwards and Teel.24

As part of a negotiated

settlement of the complaint, the Board agreed to return to federal court and
seek clarification of the continuing applicability of those orders and its
related obligations.25 Notably, in returning to court, the Board did not
pursue a declaration of unitary status, but instead filed a motion seeking
court approval of the 2006 assignment plan, arguing that its actions were
appropriate precisely because of the ongoing affirmative obligations under
26
the desegregation orders.
Following the filing of the Board's motion, the court reopened and
consolidated Edwards and Teel.27 At that time, the Pitt County Coalition for

the Education of Black Children (the "Coalition"), a community-based
education advocacy organization, and individual African American parents
joined the case as the substitute plaintiffs; GPA was permitted to enter as
intervenor-plaintiffs.28 GPA then filed a motion for unitary status, claiming
that the Board was no longer controlled by Teel and Edwards.29 The school
district opposed the motion; so did the Coalition and African American
parents, who believed the district had still not become fully integrated.30
Following court-ordered mediation, a settlement was reached which the
court approved in November 2009.31
The Consent Order specifically considered whether the Board had
eliminated the vestiges of discrimination as required by the desegregation
orders, and concluded it had not: "It is time for the School Board to follow
course and fulfill its obligation to attain unitary status so that it may reclaim
complete control over its schools."32
The court confirmed that the
desegregation orders were still controlling, and also noted that its
jurisdiction over the matter continued.33 The parties were ordered to "work

24. See, US Department of Education Office of Civil Rights Claims Processing Manual,
Section 110, (February 2015)
25. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 138.
26. Motion for Court Approval of Student Assignment Plan and Sch. Attendance Area
Policy at 1, John Doe v. Greenville Bd. of Educ., No. 6:69-CV-00702 (E.D.N.C. March 18,
2008).
27. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 138.
28. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 136; Juvenile Male 1 et al v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.
6:69-CV-702 (E.D.N.C. July 22, 2008).
29. Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Attorney's Fees at Everett
et el v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 6:69-CV-702 (E.D.N.C. August 4, 2008).
30. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 138.
31. Order at 3-4, Everett et al v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 6:69-CV-702-H (E.D.N.C.
Nov. 4, 2009).
32. Id., at 6.
33. Id.
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toward attaining unitary status so that the court may relinquish jurisdiction
over this case and restore to the school board full responsibility for the
operation of its schools," and to submit, on or before December 31, 2012, "a
report detailing the School Board's efforts and progress in achieving unitary
status and eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent
practicable." 34
In 2010, also pursuant to the Consent Order, the Coalition and the GPA
participated in two day-long Board "retreats" to discuss and develop the new
2011-12 student reassignment plan. 35 At the end of its deliberative process,
the Board rejected a proposed assignment plan which produced the most
improved racial balance of the various options presented, and instead
selected a plan which projected significant increases in racially-identifiable,
non-white schools and would open a brand new elementary school as one of
the most racially isolated schools in the district.36 Despite concerns among
both the Coalition and the GPA that the selected plan moved the district
further away from unitary status, and thereby violated the consent order and
the orders in Edwards and Teel, the Board refused requests to seek court
approval before moving forward.37
In response to the adoption of the 2011-12 reassignment plan, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion to enjoin its implementation on the grounds that it
violated the 2009 Consent Order and the Board's affirmative desegregation
obligations under Edwards and Teel.38 They argued that the board had the
burden to prove that the selected reassignment plan worked to eradicate the
vestiges of race discrimination and move the district toward unitary status,
and that it in fact did just the opposite. 39 In denying the motion, the court
ignored the uncontroverted fact that the district remained under court order
and placed the burden of proof not on the board, but on the Coalition and
individual Black parents.40 Evaluating the motion under the general
preliminary injunction standard, the court held that the Plaintiffs had not
satisfied their burden to show "likelihood of success on the underlying
merits," and additionally, that the "balance of the equities" tipped in the

34. Id.
35. Everett 1, 678 F.3d at 286, 293.
36. Id. at 286-87.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Motion for Injunctive and Other Appropriate Relief at 11-12, Everett et al v. Pitt
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 6:69-CV-702 (E.D.N.C. April 9, 2011).
39. Id. at 11.
40. Everett v. Juvenile Female 1, No. 6:69-CV-702-H, 2011 WL 3606539, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2011), vacated and remanded sub nom Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Board's favor. 41 The plaintiffs' appeal of this decision led to the Fourth
Circuit's first decision in the modem iteration of this case.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

In order to place the Everett decisions of the Fourth Circuit in the
appropriate context in the spectrum of school desegregation litigation and to
effectively evaluate their impact, some foundational background on the
evolution and de-evolution of school desegregation jurisprudence is critical.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), with its seminal declaration
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," made racial
42
segregation in schools unconstitutional.
Brown II, decided a year later,
was expressly dedicated to the issue of remedy.43 Despite that narrow focus
however, the Court failed to provide any detailed guidance for
implementation or enforcement of federal court desegregation orders.
Brown II included no specific benchmarks for the lower courts, which were
generally instructed to use their "traditional attributes of equity power" to
"eliminate a variety of obstacles" and for schools and states to do so with
"all deliberate speed." 44
For more than a decade following Brown II, the Court failed to provide
any substantive guidance on remedy or implementation. Ten years after the
1955 ruling, no more than 2% of African American children attended
integrated schools.45 A few cases declared certain overt tactics to evade
46
Brown unconstitutional,
but overall there was virtual silence from the
Court. It would take the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
authorized the federal government to initiate school desegregation suits
without any private plaintiffs and to deny federal funding to school districts
that maintained racial segregation, coupled with more aggressive

41. Everett et al v. Pitt County Board of Education, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91875
(August 16, 2011). In describing the "equities," the court cited the potential "great disruption"
of enjoining the assignment plan when school was scheduled to begin just 10 days from the
date of the order. This was particularly ironic; although the Plaintiffs' Motion was filed in
April, the court did not hold the hearing on the motion until a few weeks before the start of the
school year implementing the challenged plan.
42. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (Brown 1)
(1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (Brown
II) (1955).
43. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
44. Jd, at 300.
45. THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST
THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 5 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
46. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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enforcement from the Johnson administration, to ultimately break through
both the inertia of the courts and the massive resistance, particularly in the
South, to desegregation.47
Unlike Brown II, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
provided the first detailed guidelines for school desegregation, and
established the substantive standard by which all subsequent cases would be
evaluated. 4 8 The Court stated that once a school district has been found
constitutionally liable for operating a segregated or "dual" system, it has an
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,"
and "to come forward with a plan that promised to work realistically
'now'." 49 A desegregation plan must be "meaningful and immediate," and
must address six factors the district courts would evaluate in determining
whether the school system had become "unitary" and eliminated the vestiges
of unconstitutional segregation.50
The Court also provided that in
developing and implementing desegregation plans, school boards were
required to act in good faith." Green put to rest any legal argument about
the nature and scope of Brown, making clear that the obligation on states and
school boards was not simply to stop segregating students, but to provide
52
racially integrated educational settings.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg53 established that courts had the
authority to require more direct remedies to achieve integration, especially in
the face of delay or inadequate desegregation plans brought forth by school
districts. 54 "If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under
55
these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked.
Once a right and a
violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad." 5 6 Recognizing that because of the legacy of
residential segregation, any reliance on proximity or neighborhood schools
would mean the perpetuation of racially isolated schools, Swann approved

47. THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, supranote 1 at 5-6.
48. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 435 (stating that the six factors are: (1) student assignment; (2) faculty; (3)
staff; (4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities and; (6) facilities).
51. Id., at 439.
52. Id. at 442 (stating that school boards must be required to formulate a new plan to
fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white'
school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools).
53. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
54. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (U.S. 1971).
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id.
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the widespread use of cross district busing as a method to eliminating the
vestiges of discrimination in student assignment. 7
Green and Swann represent the pinnacle of legal rulings on
desegregation. But following the election of Richard Nixon, the aggressive
pace of school desegregation was slowed down. Nixon pulled back federal
enforcement and appointed more conservative judges to the federal bench,
including William Rehnquist and Lewis Powell, who had been the former
chair of the Richmond, Virginia school board.5 9 Powell was a staunch
opponent of busing, and had authored an amicus brief in Swann in support of
the school district.6o He would play a decisive role in the next significant
desegregation case, Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1.
Keyes was both a step forward and a turning away from the promise of
Brown. The primary significance of the Denver case was that although
neither the school district nor the state ever had a formal de jure policy of
racial segregation, the Court nonetheless held that the district policies and
62
practices had intentionally created racially segregated schools.
"Intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a
school system .

.

. creates a presumption that other segregated schooling

within the system is not adventitious." 63 This holding meant that school
districts anywhere in the country could potentially be liable for
unconstitutional racial segregation and not just those southern states that had
adopted racial segregation as a matter of law.
But the Court unfortunately missed the opportunity to eliminate the
previously established legal distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation (only the former had been held to impose constitutional
64
liability). There were five members of the Court prepared to recognize that
defacto segregation-and facially neutral polices or practices that furthered
or exacerbated such segregation violated the Equal Protection clause.
Justice Powell was the necessary fifth vote to abandon the distinction, but he
wanted the Court to pull back on the holding in Swann and its endorsement

57. Jd., at 29-30.
58. RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING
OF AMERICA 604 (2008).
59. PERLSTEIN, supranote 58 at 605.
60. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 284, 296 (1994).
61. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973) (stating that the
"single most disruptive element in education today is the widespread use of compulsory
transportation").
62. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
63. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
64. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214-15.
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of busing, to which he remained staunchly opposed. 65 Ultimately, Powell
66
wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In addition to
severely limiting the scope of school desegregation, maintaining the de
jure/de facto difference became a key factor in the significance of the
distinction between districts still under court order and those that are not,
which played a central role in Everett II.67
68
Milliken v. Bradley epitomized the opportunity that the Court had
squandered in Keyes, and helped seal the fate for broad and meaningful
school integration. By the early 1970s, white flight from Detroit left the city
69
school district over 90% African-American. Meanwhile, approximately 50
suburban, majority white districts ringed the city. 70 Following a finding of

intentional race discrimination (pursuant to the theory in Keyes) by the
district court, and given the demographic pattern that had emerged in
reaction to integration, the proposed remedy was an inter-district plan that
would include the city and the suburban schools.7 ' The Supreme Court
reversed this decision, holding that a remedy involving the white school
districts was inappropriate, since there was no evidence that those districts
had intentionally created the segregation in Detroit.72 Emphasizing that
interference with local control of schools "is contrary to the history of public
education in our country," 73 the decision put the Court's imprimatur on
"white flight" away from schools attempting to integrate. Justice Marshall,
in an eloquent and portentous dissent, wrote:
Today's holding, I fear is more a reflection of a perceived
public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the
Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is of neutral
principles of law. In the short run, it may seem the easier course to
allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up into two citiesone white and one black-but it is a course, I believe, our people
will ultimately regret.74

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

JEFFRIES, supra note 60, at 298-99, 303.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 217.
Everett 11, 788 F.3d 132, 147 (4th Cir. 2015).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
Id., 418 U.S. at 726, 800.
Id., 418 U.S. at 800.
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 244 (6th Cir. 1973), revd 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
Id., at 741.
Id., at 814-15.
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Through the 1980s and 1990s, the Court issued a series of decisions that
made it easier for districts to end federal court oversight of their schools.
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court considered whether a district could be
declared unitary as to some of the Green factors and remain under court
supervision as to others.
While the Court's "yes" answer to that question
is the reason Freeman is primarily recognized, the decision is also important
for its analysis of demographic shifts, residential segregation and, most
importantly, the idea that the causal connection between current racial
imbalances and the de jure constitutional violation may have been broken
years prior to the formal declaration of unitary status.
The Dekalb County, Georgia, school district had experienced significant
demographic shifts over the 15 years following the desegregation order,
and the Court agreed that these demographic shifts had "an immense effect"
on the racial composition of the schools and were unrelated to prior dejure
segregation.79
The Court concluded that the district's original
implementation of the 1960s era desegregation plans fully complied with the
court's mandate, and that unitary status was thus achieved in the area of
student assignment, regardless of the subsequent or current racial disparities,
since those were due to independent demographic changes. 0
It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the
federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and
massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would require
ongoing and never-ending supervision by the courts of school
districts simply because they were once de jure segregated.
Residential housing choices, and their attendant effects on the racial

75. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. Okla. City Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991)
(stressing the importance of local control and the "temporary" nature of judicial intervention,
even in the face of present racial isolation if not connected to past intentional segregation).
76. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
77. Seeid.at471.
78. See id. at 475. The African American student population grew from 5.6% in 1969
to 47% in 1986, and the northern part of the county had become predominantly white, while
the southern part of the county had become predominantly black. Id.
79. Id, at 476. Significantly, the Court discounted statistical evidence that the
demonstrated that the current ratio of black students to white students in individual schools
varied to a significant degree from the system-wide average-a metric whose critical
importance had been established in Green and Swann.
80. See id., at 494.
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composition of schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one
difficult to address through judicial remedies. 8
This particular aspect of Freeman-thata court may find that a district
has achieved unitary status at some point in the past, even without having
sought such a declaration or been so found by a court, and that therefore
subsequent and current racial segregation in schools could not be causally
related to past intentional discrimination-suggested that districts could be
declared unitary retroactively and thereby avoid being held liable under
prevailing court orders for ongoing discrimination. The Court did not go
quite that far however. Freeman stated that the unitary status declaration
was not retroactive, and that even if the chain of causality had been broken,
a district under court order still had to prove that it had complied in good
faith with that court order until there is a judicial determination of unitary
status.82 That is, even if a school district had addressed past segregation, it
could not take any actions that would resegregate the schools or otherwise
be in contravention of the controlling court orders until the court ruled that it
was unitary.8 3

In addition to these decisions, there were dozens of district and court of
appeals opinions applying these rulings in unitary status cases across the
country. While the particular details of those cases varied, some critical
consensus emerged. First, as previously mentioned, unitary status could not
be granted retroactively.8 4 Second, in seeking a unitary status determination,
the school district had the burden of proof to show that it has eliminated "the
vestiges of past discrimination .

.

. to the extent practicable"

with regard to

the Green factors. Courts have also repeatedly held that these factors were
not exclusive, but that various ancillary factors, including student
achievement, student discipline, and teacher quality, could also be

81. Id. at 495. "Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally
required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the
affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished . . . ." Id. at 494 (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971)). The Court also emphasized that
the passage of time may be a critical factor in determining the significance of any current
racial imbalances. Id.
82. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492 (1992) (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Oklahoma City Pub.
Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991)).
83. See id.
84. See Cappachione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 285
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (explaining that a unitary status determination is not retroactive, and
therefore, "the termination of court supervision today cannot 'relate back' to an earliertime."
Id. at 285 (emphasis added)).
85. See Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50
(1991).
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considered. 1 Finally, the district would have to prove that, at all times it
was subject to the court's oversight, it had "complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree ....
IV. THE 2011 LITIGATION AND APPEAL

In their appeal of the decision refusing to enjoin the 2011-12
assignment plan, Plaintiffs urged the court to recognize its historical power
and responsibility to supervise compliance with the controlling
desegregation orders.
They also argued that, given the admitted preunitary status of Pitt County Schools, the Board should have been required
to bear the burden to prove that the adopted 2011-12 assignment plan was in
compliance with its affirmative duty to eradicate the vestiges of the racially
discriminatory dual system.89
In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit issued a powerful
reaffirmation of the significance of the bright-line distinction between
districts still under court order and those that have been declared unitary or
were never subject to court oversight. 90 The Board first challenged whether
the district court decision was a "final order," since the Consent Order said
the matter was to come back before the court in December 2012.91 The
Court of Appeals rejected that claim, and held that the existence of the
December 2012 reporting date had no bearing on the Board's burden-as a
school district still under court order to show that the 2011 plan moved the
92
district towards unitary status.
"Any other conclusion would necessarily,
but impermissibly, provide the School Board with the latitude to
discriminate pending the resolution of some future hearing." 93

86. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491-92. See generally Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 319, 330-32 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that teacher quality, student
achievement, and student disciple are other factor that can be considered).
87. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50; see also Belk, 269 F.3d at 332 (4th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the district court in that case had complied with the desegregation decree in
good faith).
88. See Everettl, 678 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
89. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Authorities on Evidentiary Questions and Contested
Issues of Law at 1-2, Everett et al v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-2000), 2013 WL 3810481 (E.D.N.C.).
90. See generally Everett 1, 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012) (reversing the district court
and holding that the school board had the burden of proof).
91. Seeid.at288.
92. See id. at 290-91 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 357
(1979)).
93. See id. at 288. The significance on the 2012 date to report back to the court on the
progress toward unitary status was a critical aspect of Judge Niemeyer's dissent.
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Turning to the substantive issues in the appeal, the court summarized the
controlling Supreme Court school desegregation precedents to reaffirm that
in districts still under court order, the presumption is that existing racial
disparities are the result of past discriminatory conduct, and that therefore
the Board must bear the evidentiary burden to demonstrate that its actions
"are consistent with its continuing affirmative duty eliminate
discrimination." 94 Moreover, the court highlighted that the precedents all
clearly establish that this burden remains with the school board until it
achieves unitary status. 95
Reviewing the language of the 2009 Consent Order and its
acknowledgement of the controlling Edwards and Teel orders, the court
96
concluded that placing the burden of proof on the plaintiffs was erroneous.
Given that there is no dispute that the school district has not
attained unitary status, the evidentiary burden should have been on
the School Board to prove that the 2011-12 Assignment Plan is
consistent with the controlling desegregation orders and fulfills the
School Board's affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of
discrimination and move toward unitary status.97
The lower court decision was vacated and the case was remanded, and
the court stressed the substantial burden on the Board on remand:
The School Board's articulation of its evidentiary burden is
inaccurate. Whereas the School Board's argument is premised on
its claim that the 2011-12 Assignment Plan does not move the
district further from a unitary system, the School Board's actual
burden is to establish that the 2011-12 Assignment plan move the
school district towardunitary status.98
Judge Niemeyer's dissent, like the lower court, ignored the fact that the
district was still under court order. In fact, he asserted that the 2009 Consent
Order "disposed of the foundational disputes" and supplanted the Edwards

94.
521, 535
95.
96.
(1979)).
97.
98.

See id. at 289 (quoting Riddick by Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d
(4th Cir. 1986)).
See id., at 290.
See id. at 290-91 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 357
Id. at 290.
Id., at 291.
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and Teel orders in their entirety. 99 As a result, the only claims the plaintiffs
could now bring "would have to be couched as a breach of the settlement
agreement and consent order."' 00 Analyzing the case under this procedural
posture, removed from the context of the district's non-unitary status, Judge
Niemeyer concluded that the lower court was correct in assigning the burden
of proof (to show a breach of the Consent Agreement) to plaintiffs.' 0
Although the case was remanded for further consideration, the court's
opinion was a critical and powerful endorsement of the fundamental
evidentiary significance of the distinction between districts still under court
order and those that are not.102 For communities and education advocates
continuing to struggle with segregation in districts still under court order, the
decision made clear that in any continuing litigation, the burden would be on
the school board to prove that its actions were consistent with its affirmative
obligations to remedy the vestiges of discrimination, rather than on the
plaintiffs to meet the nearly impossible hurdle of proving intent.
V. THE 2012-2013 LITIGATION
Following the appeals court decision, on June 15, 2012 Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Expedited Reconsideration on Remand.103 Three weeks later, the
Board filed its Motion for Declaration of Unitary Status, seeking an end to
all further judicial oversight of the school system and arguing that the
district had been unitary for several years, as early as 2000.104 The Board
asserted that its motion should be heard at the same time that the court
considered Plaintiffs' motion on remand. o0 Plaintiffs opposed consolidating
the issues for hearing, arguing that the Fourth Circuit's decision made clear

99. Id, at 292 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
100. Id
101. See id. at 293 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The dissent also focused on the December
2012 reporting date in the Consent Agreement, stating that there should be not be "any review
of this issue [unitary status] until the December 31, 2012 report is filed . . . and the issue is
present to the court," but also acknowledged that "the ultimate question of whether unitary
status has been achieved . . is a different question and will have to be satisfied by evidence
produced by the Board." Id. at 292-93.
102. See id. at 284 (holding that the school board would have the burden of proof to
prove that its actions were consistent with its affirmative obligations to remedy the vestiges of
discrimination).
103. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Expedited
Reconsideration on Remand, Everett et al v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir.
2012) (No. 6:69-CV-702-H), 2012 WL 8679642 (E.D.N.C.).
104. Defendant's Motion for Declaration of Unitary Status at 1-2, Everett et al v. Pitt
County Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 6:69-CV-702-H).
105. Id. at 2.

728

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 713

that a ruling on their motion regarding the 2011-12 assignment plan was a
condition precedent to the court's consideration of unitary status (that is,
unless the Board could meet its burden and prove that the assignment plan
was consistent with its affirmative desegregation obligations, it could not be
declared unitary). The district court disagreed, ruling that it would "address
the matters together," 0 6 and the Board's unitary status motion and the
Plaintiffs' motion challenging the 2011-12 student reassignment plan, were
tried by the court in July 2013.107
The district court issued its order on September 25, 2013, declaring the
school district unitary "in all respects," and releasing the school district from
all desegregation orders.'os The court found the Board had "fulfilled its duty
to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination . . . prior to the [1986] merger

[of Pitt County and Greenville City schools],"' 09 and declined to consider
Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction, dismissing it as moot "[i]n light of the
finding that the school district is unitary ....
The district court never substantively considered the 2011-12
assignment plan nor the evidence of its segregative impacts. By finding that
both pre-merger districts had fully desegregated by the early 1980s and had
therefore broken the chain of causality from the era of de jure segregation,
any current racial disparities among schools must be the result of
demographic change and private choice, not the responsibility of the school
system.'" Therefore the court was free to disregard the evidence that the
2011-2012 plan increased racial isolation in Pitt County Schools, and
simply ruled that the motion was moot.112

Even assuming, arguendo, that the School Board is unable to
meet its burden of proof as to the 2011-2012 plan, an order
enjoining the continued implementation of this plan would be
pointless since the school district has been declared unitary and no

106. Order Requiring Status Conference and Administrative Hearing at 4, Everett et al v.
Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 6:69-CV-702-H).
107. Everett v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189693, *1 (E.D.N.C.
Sept. 25, 2013).
108. Everett v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189693, *46 (E.D.N.C.
Sept. 25, 2013).
109. Id. at *35.
110. Id. at *46.
111. Id. at *13-14.
112. Id. at *46.
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longer has an affirmative duty to ensure that its policies move the
district toward unitary status."" 3
Convinced that the court's decision was inconsistent with precedents
establishing that unitary status could not be granted retroactively, the express
language of the 2009 Consent Order,1 4 and Everett I's direction that, upon
remand, the school board must bear the burden to prove that the 2011-12
student assignment plan "moves the school district toward unitary status,""
Plaintiffs again appealed to the Fourth Circuit.16
VI.

THE

2013 APPEAL

(EVERETTII)

The primary issues in the Everett II appeal were the trial court's
declaration of unitary status retroactive to 1986 and its concomitant refusal
to make a determination as to whether the 2011 student assignment plan
moved the district toward unitary status, as the court's 2012 opinion
required." 7 This time, in another 2-1 decision, the court affirmed the district
court ruling." 8
The essence of the new opinion turned on the questions of the
retroactive nature of the lower court's opinion and whether a ruling on the
Plaintiffs' original motion to enjoin the 2011-12 assignment plan was a
condition precedent to a determination as to unitary status.'19 The analysis
begins with a review of the core elements of a unitary status determination
(discussed in part 3, supra). The court noted that "until declared unitary, a
school district retains a continuing duty to work toward eliminating the
vestiges of its past discrimination," and reaffirms that "a school district
operates under a presumption that current disparities are causally related to
prior segregation, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the school
board," until it has achieved unitary status.120 But then the court makes a

113. Id. at *46-47.
114. See generally Order Approving Settlement and Grant.
115. Everett I, 678 F.3d at 291.
116. Id. at 284.
117. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 142-43. The case was argued in Richmond on December 9,
2014, before the same panel that heard Everett I: Judges Niemeyer, Wynn, and Diaz. Judge
Wynn dissented
118. Id. at 150.
119. See supra Part III.
120. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 143, 145 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102
(1995); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971); Sch. Bd. of the
City of Richmond, Va. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987); Riddick by Riddick v.
Sch. Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 535 (4th Cir. 1986); Vaughns by Vaughns v. Bd. of
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bold conclusion on retroactivity. 12 Relying on its 1987 decision in Sch. Bd.
of Richmond v. Baliles,122 the opinion states "[i]mportantly, the burden of
proof shifts, not when the school district is declared unitary, but when the
district court determines is first achieved that status." 123 The court then
minimized the significance of this critical aspect of the opinion: "[t]he
court's "retroactive" unitary status declaration merely shifts the burden of
proving discriminatory intent."1 24
In affirming the lower court's decision to consider the board's unitary
status motion first and its refusal to even rule on the Plaintiffs' original
motion, Judge Diaz invoked the talisman of local control. Citing heavily
from Freeman, Dowell, and Milliken, the court said
It would be anathema to the goal of quickly and efficiently
returning a school district to local control if the district court were
to ignore its conviction that the Pitt County school district is
unitary, and instead analyze the 2011-12 student assignment plan
through a prism of state-mandated segregation that no longer
exists.125
Had the Plaintiffs' alleged or proved intentional discrimination by the
Board in adopting the 2011 student assignment however, the analysis would
be different. But because the motion for injunctive relief "depends entirely
on their allegation that the plan moves the district further from unitary
status," and the lower court concluded that "the school district was unitary at
the time of the plan's implementation (and has remained so), it did not err in
dismissing Plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief as moot."1 26

The opinion then turns to the lower court's evaluation of the Green
factors, emphasizing that while there was a presumption that existing racial

Educ. of Prince George's Cty_, 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985)).
121. See id. at 143.
122. 829 F.2d. 1308 (4th Cir. 1987).
123. Everett II, 788 F.3d at 143 (emphasis added). The court asserted that in Baliles, it
affirmed a finding by the district court that the school district had achieved unitary status
(although had not been declared unitary by the court) sometime prior to the hearing currently
before the court, and therefore shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to prove the current racial
disparities were vestiges of past discrimination, then found that plaintiffs failed to meet that
burden.
124. Id., at 144.
125. Id.
126. Id., at 145. Of course, the issue of intentional discrimination and the burden of
proof is at the core of the unitary status analysis and the basis of the bright line that
distinguished districts still under court order.
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disparities are traceable to the legacy of de jure segregation, "that
presumption is overcome when a school district demonstrates that racial
disparities are a result, not of its present or past discrimination, but rather
external factors, such as demographic changes, beyond the district's
control."1 27 Specifically noting that "[i]n cases in which the district court's
factual findings turn on ... the weighing of conflicting evidence during a
bench trial, such findings are entitled to even greater deference," the lower
court's determination to rely exclusively on the student assignment analysis
provided by the Board's expert witness was affirmed, as were the court's
factual findings that the district had attained unitary status on the remaining
Green factors.128 The opinion concludes by approving the lower court's
determination that "the Board has demonstrated commendable good faith in
complying with the desegregation orders."1 29
Judge Wynn, who authored Everett I, wrote a blistering dissent,
asserting that the district court decision "utterly fails to analyze the facts in
this case in compliance with this Court's instructions and established
Supreme Court precedent."1 30 He cites two fundamental flaws in the district
court ruling: first, it "failed to consider the effects of the 2011-12 Plan when
determining what the School Board complied in good faith with prior
orders;"131 and second, "gave retroactive effect to its declaration of unitary
status so as to retroactively release the Board of its obligations under
controlling orders in direct contravention of .. . EverettI" 132
Judge Wynn begins with the question of good faith, an issue
"particularly salient in the case," given the 2009 Consent Order, "which
required the Board to move towards unitary status."133 He then chides the
lower court for its failure to consider that the 2011-12 assignment plan,
"which came on the heels of the 2009 Consent Order and resulted in more
rather than fewer racially imbalanced schools in the district ... a violation
of the Board's obligation ... under the 2009 Order."1 34 Because the Board
had less discriminatory alternative plans from which to choose, but selected
the plan "with full awareness of the regressive impacts on the school

127. Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
128. Id. at 147 (quoting F.T.C. v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 894 (4th Cir. 2014).
129. Id, at 149. The opinion pointed to the long dormancy of the case, the Board's
efforts with the 2006 assignment plan, and its initial efforts to implement the Edwards and
Teel orders as evidence of good faith.
130. Id, at 151 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id, at 154.
133. Id
134. Id, at 155.
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district's racial balance," Judge Wynn concludes that the Board had failed to
act in good faith. 135
The dissent was even more troubled by the retroactivity of the unitary
status determination.
Harkening back to Everett I's warning that
prematurely relieving the Board of its burden under the existing court orders
would "impermissibly provide the School Board with latitude to
discriminate pending the resolution of some future hearing,"1 36 Judge Wynn
recognized that this is in fact exactly the outcome produced by the district
court's opinion and the majority's affirmance.1 37 He found the majority's
reliance on Baliles misplaced given the unique procedural posture of Everett
II, and in particular the existence of the 2009 Consent Order and the court's
decision in Everett I.138 "Such a holding has troubling implications: will
others bound by desegregation orders take the majority's holding as a signal
that de facto unitary status in the eyes of a school district gives the school
district license to act as though it were not under court order?"1 39
VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS

The Fourth Circuit's ruling in Everett II represents not only a reversal of
its own previous opinion in the case, but a subversion of long-standing
unitary status and school desegregation precedents that, as Judge Wynn
noted, portends ominously for any future efforts to hold school districts still
under court order accountable to fully and meaningfully integrate their
schools. 140
As to the specific facts of the Everett cases, the court's failure to
consider the unique procedural and factual context of the case is particularly
troubling.141 Although the original desegregation orders had been dormant
for decades, unlike many of the cases relied on by the majority opinion, by
Everett II there had been recent, active litigation that not only reaffirmed the
continuing viability of those previous orders, but also included a new
Consent Order and a Fourth Circuit decision that emphasized the district's
non-unitary status and its affirmative duty to move towards fully and finally

135. Id.
136. Id., at 155 (quoting Everett et al v. Pitt County Bd. of Ed (Everett I), 678 F.3d 281,
288 (4th Cir. 2012)).
137. Id., at 155.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id., at 151, 155.
141. See id., at 150 (citing Everett et al v. Pitt County Bd. of Ed (Everett I), 678 F.3d
281, 288 (4th Cir. 2012)).

2016]

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

733

addressing that status. As a result, the Supreme Court's stated concern about
the impacts of the passage of timel42 should have had no substantive bearing,
since a range of questions about the district's continuing desegregation
obligations had been asked and answered several times within the preceding
five years. 143
The undisputed evidence about the segregative effects of the 2011-12
assignment plan also undercuts the court's "good faith" analysis. The
Board, while still non-unitary and subject to the desegregation orders,
Consent Order, and Everett I, adopted a student assignment plan that it knew
would increase racial segregation in the schools in Pitt County, and rejected
a less discriminatory alternative. Such action was plainly in contravention
of the orders and, according to Freeman, clear evidence of bad faith:
A history of good-faith compliance is evidence that any current
racial imbalance is not the product of a new de jure violation, and
enables the district court to accept the school board's representation
that it has accepted the principle of racial equality and will not
suffer intentional discrimination in the future.1 44
Equally problematic in this case was the retroactive declaration of
unitary status. Not only does this conclusion undermine the well-established
bright line that distinguishes districts under court order and those that are
not, but it effectively cedes the determination of unitary status and its related
obligations to the Board itself.1 45 And so in Everett we find a school board
that asserts it is under court order and therefore obligated to consider race in
its 2005 student assignment plan, then when challenged about discrimination
in its 2011-12 plan asserts it attained unitary status decades earlier.146 The
district court then concludes that it need not even consider the adverse
impacts of the plan, because the Board had no obligation to comply with
court orders since 1986, even though it had itself issued an order in 2009 that
the Board had not achieved unitary status.
As Judge Wynn noted, the broader problem with a retroactive
declaration of unitary status (or the retroactive effect of a present-day
declaration) is that it relieves a pre-unitary school board of its affirmative

142. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491 (considering the passage of time and the degree
to which racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of constitutional violations may
diminish).
143. See Everett H1, 788 F.3d at 145.
144. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added).
145. Everett H1, 788 F.3d at 144..
146. Everett H1, 788 F.3d at 139.
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duty to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination before a court has
determined that such relief should be granted. Retroactive effect allows a
school board to act in a potentially discriminatory fashion or to implement
policies with overt discriminatory effects without having been declared
unitary. This undermines the bright line burden of proof, presumptions
regarding racial disparities, and affirmative remedial obligations that attach
to a district still under court order, including the absolute obligation to
comply in good faith with those court orders, until the district is declared
unitary.1 47 Additionally, retroactive unitary status allows a school board to
begin to act as though it had already achieved unitary status (and to ignore,
for example, the increased racial isolation in a proposed student assignment
plan), without court order or by seeking such a declaration after the fact.
This radical re-imaging of good faith and the retroactive application of
unitary status creates new and significant challenges for pursuing integration
in school districts still under court desegregation orders. Because the
Supreme Court has limited the opportunities for promoting racial diversity in
districts that are no longer or that never were under court order, those
districts which can still consider race under their remedial obligations had
offered the best legal strategy for fully realizing the vision of Brown and
finally eliminating the vestiges of discrimination. The Fourth Circuit's
break with precedent in Everett II, with its abandonment of any substantive
or practical evaluation of good faith and its willingness to look back in time
past continuing and current inequities, may create a new reality in which a
school board still under judicial supervision has the ability to decide when
and whether it should comply with court orders, and may soon bring about a
new wave of unitary status declarations, even as our schools grow more and
more racially segregated.

147. See id. at 151.
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